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AbstractAsymmetric distribution of opportunities among actors can reinforce the conflict between individual and collective interests in social dilemma situations. The present study investigates the interplay of asymmetric distribution of opportunities to consume resources and three choice systems: individual choice, median choice, and majority voting. Participants (N = 248) took part in a common resource game in groups of four under each of the three choice systems. We examined the average percentage taken of the resource as well as satisfaction and fairness ratings depending on the choice system in interaction with (a) whether the distribution of opportunities among group members was symmetric versus asymmetric, and (b) the status of an actor (advantaged versus disadvantaged) within asymmetric groups. Both implemented collective choice systems (median choice and majority voting) increased sustainable resource management, especially in asymmetric groups, by restricting overconsumption of advantaged individuals, as well as satisfaction and fairness ratings. Collective choice increased collective welfare by increasing profits of disadvantaged individuals and members of symmetric groups. The results indicate that in the presence of asymmetric distribution of opportunities, collective choice is a means to reconcile the conflict between individual and collective interests in social dilemmas and to foster sustainable resource management.dc.description.abstract
PublisherUniversität Ulmdc.publisher
LicenseCC BY 4.0 Internationaldc.rights
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KeywordCommon resource gamedc.subject
KeywordCollective choicedc.subject
KeywordSocial dilemmadc.subject
Dewey Decimal GroupDDC 150 / Psychologydc.subject.ddc
LCSHSocial choicedc.subject.lcsh
TitleCollective choice fosters sustainable resource management in the presence of asymmetric opportunitiesdc.title
Resource typeWissenschaftlicher Artikeldc.type
GNDSoziales Dilemmadc.subject.gnd
FacultyFakultät für Ingenieurwissenschaften, Informatik und Psychologieuulm.affiliationGeneral
InstitutionInstitut für Psychologie und Pädagogikuulm.affiliationSpecific
Peer reviewjauulm.peerReview
DCMI TypeTextuulm.typeDCMI
In cooperation withAarhus Universityuulm.cooperation
Is Supplemented By
DOI of original publication
Source - Title of sourceScientific Reportssource.title
Source - Place of publicationNature Researchsource.publisher
Source - Volume10source.volume
Source - Year2020source.year
Source - Article number10724source.articleNumber
Source - eISSN2045-2322source.identifier.eissn
FundingBaden-Württemberg Stiftunguulm.funding
Open AccessDOAJ Gold, Green Publisheduulm.OA
University Bibliographyjauulm.unibibliographie

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CC BY 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as CC BY 4.0 International