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Renegotiation-proof relational contracts

Erstveröffentlichung
2013
Authors
Goldluecke, Susanne
Kranz, Sebastian
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel


Published in
Games and Economic Behavior ; 80 (2013). - S. 157-178. - ISSN 0899-8256
Link to publication
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009
Faculties
Fakultät für Mathematik und Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Institutions
Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Subject headings
[Free subject headings]: Renegotiation | Infinitely repeated games | Side payments | Optimal penal codes | REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA | SIDE-PAYMENTS | COLLUSION
[DDC subject group]: DDC 330 / Economics

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